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Abstract In this introduction we set out some salient
themes that will help structure understanding of a complex
set of intersecting issues discussed in this special issue on
the work of Marc Lewis: (1) conceptual foundations of the
disease model, (2) tolerating the disease model given socio-
political environments, and (3) A third wave: refining con-
ceptualization of addiction in the light of Lewis’s model.
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Introduction
With the development of neuroimaging techniques in
the early nineties, our understanding of addictive behav-
ior advanced significantly. Addiction neuroscience pro-
vided evidence for some of the intuitions we held about
addiction, posed new questions, and offered the promise
of new treatments. Many, like the National Institute on
Drug Abuse (NIDA) and erstwhile Director Alan
Leshner, thought these neuroscientific insights so revo-
lutionary that they started campaigning for a paradigm
shift in how we think about addiction. Their approach to
understanding addiction assumed neuroscience as the
preeminent level to any investigation of addictive be-
haviour; famously they claimed, and continue to claim,
that addiction is a chronic relapsing brain disease [1].
Prior to this, the so-called moral model of addiction
viewed addicts as responsible and blameworthy. On this
account addicts have opted for a lifestyle in which they
make bad choices, and they are culpable in relation to the
actions taken to secure and consume their preferred sub-
stance. The brain disease model of addiction (BDMA)
was thus welcomed as a much needed alternative to this,
but over the years a growing discomfort arose with the
exclusive focus on neuroscientific explanations of addic-
tive behaviors. Several theorists were critical of the
BDMA [see [2] for an overview], but there had been little
systematic critique of it, especially from within science.
Then, in 2015, Marc Lewis published The Biology of
Desire. Why Addiction is not a Disease [2]. This book is
unique for several reasons, and arguably the most im-
portant of these is that Lewis’s critique derives from
within the field: for Lewis, himself, is a developmental
neuroscientist who has thought about and published in
the addictions field for many years. Lewis offers a
reinterpretation of the neuroscientific data on addiction,
free from what he calls the disease bias. He criticizes the
skewed way in which the neuroscientific data is current-
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condition is an aspect of neurobiology and therefore not
a learned or social problem but an alienating pathology.
Lewis criticizes the hierarchy this legitimizes, with med-
icine dominating at the top and Bpatients^ at the
bottom. But, more importantly, when we reframe
addiction as the development of coping habits
within a social matrix, and when we consider that
the brain is designed for exactly that, then the
neuroscientific data takes on a completely different
meaning. According to Lewis, addiction is an ex-
treme outcome of a normal functioning brain.
Lewis encapsulates his account of addiction this way:
it is a habit that grows and self-perpetuates relatively
quickly, when we repeatedly pursue the same highly
attractive goal. Or, in a phrase, it arises when motivated
repetition leads to deep learning. Addictive patterns
develop rapidly and become more deeply entrenched
than other, less compelling habits, and that is be-
cause of the intensity of the attraction that motivates
us to repeat them. Quite different conditions may
initiate these patterns – based on various intersec-
tions of dispositional and environmental factors –
but emotional turmoil during childhood or adoles-
cence is typically a culprit, when addictive rewards
may serve as a source for relief and comfort.
We took Marc Lewis’s book as a starting point for an
extensive analysis of the value of the BDMA, and to
explore alternative conceptualizations of addiction. We
are extremely grateful to Marc for agreeing to take part
in this project for Neuroethics, for helping us with
suggestions on its direction, for preparing a detailed
target article [3], and for his carefully considered re-
sponses to the essays. The brief given to our contributors
was to consider both the book and target article (and any
other related materials from Lewis’s writings), and to
address key themes raised by them, especially around
the central argument that addiction ought not to be
considered a disease, but rather is a condition resulting
from the development of deeply ingrained habitual prac-
tices. Our invitees include key figures in the field, and
are representative of its diversity; we are grateful to them
also for their generous efforts for this double issue.
In the remainder of this introduction we set out some
salient themes that will help structure understanding of a
complex set of intersecting issues: (1) conceptual foun-
dations of the disease model, (2) retaining the disease
model given socio-political environments, and (3) A
third wave: refining conceptualization of addiction in
the light of Lewis’s model.
We approach this via brief introductions of the papers
set against these themes.
The Conceptual Foundations of the Disease Model:
Testing Lewis
Many of the papers contain objections to Lewis’s cri-
tique of the disease model. And although some of the
writers taking this approach also question a range of
conceptual foundations presupposed by the disease la-
bel, they use Lewis’s account as a launching pad to
develop their own positive theories. This approach
yielded a range of very interesting new ideas, which
we now summarise.
Satel and Lillienfeld [4] point out that before we can
decide whether addiction is a brain disease, wemust first
decide whether it constitutes a disease in the first place.
They note that there is very little consensus in psychia-
try, and in other domains of medicine, about what con-
stitutes a disease, and they doubt that this issue can be
solved scientifically, as Lewis tries, by reinterpreting
neuroscientific data (this objection is shared by Wake-
field [5], as well as Henden & Gjelsvik [6]). Satel and
Lillienfeld think that engaging in this classification de-
bate is potentially fruitless and that the rational response
is to develop an understanding of addiction that under-
scores the way a range of complex behaviours can be
analysed in different dimensions ‘…ranging from mo-
lecular function and structure and brain physiology to
psychology, psychosocial environment, and social and
cultural relations.’ The issue of the status of addiction
thus cannot avoid questions of normativity that feature
in those domains.
Berridge [7] also argues that disease is a tricky con-
cept and one which he tries to avoid using. Like Satel
and Lillienfeld he thinks we should ‘put it behind us’
and that we should focus on the actual features and
mechanisms of addiction itself. One difficulty he men-
tions is that ‘brain disease’ brings to mind cases like
Alzheimer’s, tumors and strokes, where ‘pathological
lesions’ or ‘shriveling neurons’ are present. Addiction is
not like that, and it is probably unfair to consider most
addicts as significantly brain damaged. However,
Berridge take a softer stance than Satel and Lilienfeld,
when he says the disease label is not unreasonable and
deserves to be tolerated. Distinct neural changes in the
brain involved in addiction are extreme enough to be
viewed as pathological. He worries about what would
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happen if those advocating against the brain disease
label got their way, warning that ‘they would not like
what would follow [for therapy of the affected persons]’.
Abandonment of the disease concept might result in a
‘fossilization’ of existing treatment methods. Neverthe-
less, for the sake of research funding, new and effective
treatment methods and public understanding, we need,
as Nick Heather puts it, to move to Lewis’s ‘third stage
in the governing image of addiction’.
Wakefield [5, 8], who has written extensively about
the concept of disease in psychiatry, also takes up the
disease classification issue. In a two-part wide-ranging
response he argues that even granting the re-
interpretation of the brain evidence, Lewis’s arguments
against the brain disease classification do not follow.
Could it be that Lewis’s story about how development
goes in addiction turns out to be compatible with it being
a disease (or a disorder) even if we accept the story about
the brain changes accompanying addiction? Lewis’s ar-
gument had built on the premise that in order for addic-
tion to be a disease, some specific neurological-level
mechanism has to be broken. However, when we define
disease as being a harmful dysfunction, Wakefield’s key
concept here, we see that dysfunction can occur for many
reasons other than a broken mechanism. Wakefield ar-
gues that although the brains of addicted people are
functioning normally, as Lewis outlines, addiction is
nonetheless a medical disorder because the desire/delib-
eration/choice system is not functioning properly. The
disorder occurs because of peremptory desires that are
operating ‘…outside of biologically designed parameters
and [which] override the system’s usual adaptive work-
ings. It is a dysfunction of the brain to be so sensitized to
opiates or alcohol as to be unable to function as biolog-
ically designed due to need for substance intake, even if
this dysfunction occurs via a normal learning system.’
Henden & Gjelsvik take a similar position [6]. Based
on the idea of neuroplasticity, Lewis rejects the
neuronormativity that underlines the BDMA. This is
the idea that the brain is a normative thing that can go
wrong and be subject to repair. Addiction is a disease,
then, according to the BDMA because brain changes
deviate from norms of neural function. Lewis’s point,
however, is that there is no way to establish these norms.
But Henden & Gjelsvik argue that this is only one
version of the BDMA. There is another pathway to
argue that addiction is a disorder: through dysfunction.
Henden and Gjelsvik are torn on the question of whether
addiction is a brain disease. Although they think that
there are enough good reasons to argue that addiction is
a mental or behavioral disorder, they worry about the
case for disease notwithstanding their critique of Lewis
on this question. For, in the same vein as Wakefield,
they think that a deviation from norms of neural function
and architecture is neither necessary nor (perhaps) suf-
ficient as ground for disease attribution. As they say,
‘Whether addiction is a brain disease or not is not…
something that can be determined solely on the basis of
evidence from neuroscience.’
Szalavitz [9] argues as well that the most important
thing is that we recognize that addiction is compulsive
and has negative consequences, yet she is closely
aligned with Lewis to the extent that she agrees addic-
tion is a learning and developmental condition.
Szalavitz is taken with Lewis’s analogy between addic-
tion and love, for she thinks that an exploration of
attachment neuroscience is a fruitful way to explore
the question. The midbrain motivational systems are
implicated in bonding, whether it is with offspring or
with the continued use of drugs. ‘Disease’, she thinks, is
an imprecise word (with a lot of damaging baggage)
whose main function is to generate access to medical
care. And although she agrees with Lewis about this
damaging nature of the disease label she also thinks
there are times when people need (evidence-based)
medical treatment for their addictive condition. Howev-
er, she emphasise that addiction as a disease is not like
cancer or pneumonia, but rather resembles ADHD or
depression. Hence it does not only require medical
treatment, but a ‘panoply of social, medical and
psychoeducation options.’ Szalavitz, like several of the
writers, is concerned not to get bogged down too much
in the classification question, but rather to pay attention
to the nuance associated with the place of addiction in
social settings. Public perceptions of addiction and ad-
dicts lead to harm and stigma for example. Another
interesting thought she offers is comparison to cases of
ADHD, dyslexia and autism. Developmental differ-
ences can lead to differences in ability, and disability
advocates have argued these are not diseases if they are
built out of different wirings in the brain. What we have
here is neurodiversity. Addicted persons have a blame-
less impairment, yet they retain an ability to change.
Flanagan [10] argues that not only is the word ‘dis-
ease’ scientifically imprecise, but so is the word ‘addic-
tion’. ‘Disease’ is a folk term and carries too many
accretions of competing and inconsistent usages, often
with moralistic connotations. So it is not useful.
Introduction: Testing and Refining Lewis’s Critique of the BDMA 3
However, in his eyes Lewis and the BDMA seem to
agree on the main thing: that addiction is ‘unquestion-
ably destructive’, and that it requires brain changes. The
BDMA defines these changes as ‘brain damage’ while
Lewis argues that they mistake normal pruning for
damage and defines these changes as ‘learning’. Flana-
gan argues that we shouldn’t aim for a unified theory of
addiction, hinting rather that there are many elements on
a continuum so that the word ‘addiction’would be better
replaced by ‘substance use disorder’, something that can
be assessed along a spectrum from mild to severe. He
worries that the attempt to provide pithy short defini-
tions of addiction – as both NIDA and Lewis do –
inevitably leaves out much of the phenomena needed
for a proper understanding and for making distinctions
between what goes on in addiction and what goes on in
other conditions captured by the short definitions, the
by-catch caught from casting an indiscriminate net. So
we need to be more fine-grained in our attempts to get
this right.
Does the Disease Model Deserve to Be Retained
Based on Its Socio-Political Merits?
A second theme explored whether the BDMA, although
conceptually flawed, deserved to be retained for socio-
political purposes in case it has a beneficial effect on
treatment and the de-stigmatization of addicted people.
The articles of Hall, Carter & Barnett [11], Nagel &
Frank [12], and Heather [13] explore these issues. They
argue that the BDMA has not fulfilled its promises in
improving treatment and reducing the stigma of sub-
stance dependent people.
Wayne Hall, Adrian Carter and Anthony Barnett
[11]argue for a conceptualisation of addiction ‘that does
justice to our understanding of the effects that addictive
drugs have on the brain while taking into account evi-
dence that behavioural, social and economic factors also
affect drug use and addiction.’ This evidential synthesis
however, they argue, has only barely begun. As long as
this synthesis has not happened, people will be tempted
to use simplified models of addiction like the BDMA.
Nick Heather [13] points out that although several
studies have shown that a majority of people have
adopted the disease model, this has not led to a decline
in moral attitudes towards addiction (see also the paper
of Nagel & Frank). Biogenetic explanations of addiction
increase endorsement of a new, negative stereotype of
substance users in which they are dangerous and incur-
able. Heather conceptualizes addiction as a disorder of
choice. ‘Addiction is seen as a disorder of choice in the
sense that it represents a kind of failure to make consis-
tent choices over time…A person makes a strong reso-
lution at time t1 to desist from a specified behav-
iour at time t2 but, when t2 occurs, fails to carry
out that resolution. When that happens repeatedly
and distressingly, we can describe this pattern of
behavior as addiction.’
Saskia Nagel and Lily Frank [12] address explicitly
the question of the relation between addiction and mo-
rality. They argue that although one of the alleged ben-
efits of the disease model was that it would de-moralize
(and de-stigmatize) addiction, this is not necessarily the
case. They explore whether there are non-disease
models of addiction that do not have the effect of re-
moralizing the condition, concluding that Lewis, among
others, offers one. They focus on moral responsibility
attributions (via reasons-responsiveness) as the key no-
tion in the moralization question and point out that
deficits here derive from multiple causes, disease being
just one. They agree that Lewis’s account, among
others, can be regarded as compatible with a diminution
in reasons-responsiveness.
AThird Stage in Understanding Addiction: Refining
Conceptualization of Addiction in the Light
of Lewis’s Model
Many of the contributors critical of Lewis (in some
respects), nevertheless find fault with Lewis’s target
(the BDMA). For example Satel & Lillienfeld [4] think
that Lewis’s account paradoxically reinforces a
neurocentric view of addiction because it is written in
the language of biology – the lingua franca of human
physical disease. And Hall, Carter & Barnett [11] think
that Lewis’s analysis of the neurobiological evidence
overlaps quite significantly with that of the BDMA.
Nevertheless, these authors, and many others, applaud
not just Lewis’s attack on the BDMA, but the highly
detailed and plausible alternative account he proposes.
Moreover, this satisfaction with such an alternative
leads to a general sense in which Lewis’s devel-
opmental model may be refined in a kind of third
wave synthesis. As editors we had a sense of some
genuine intellectual progress being made, particu-
larly on the conceptualization question and its
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implications for practice. We mention here some
salient examples.
George Ainslie [14] largely agrees with Lewis’s po-
sition. Addiction is the result of a normal process that
does not imply lack of responsiveness to motivation. Yet
Lewis’s description of addiction in habit terms he thinks
does not sufficiently capture the process through which
habits become entrenched. Calling addiction a habit is
really only the starting point for understanding what it is
that persists in this condition. Ainslie describes two
recursive phenomena that help explain this. These are
dynamic and self-reinforcing phenomena based on
‘intertemporal bargains that have gone bad’ and losses
to the hedonic attractions of non-addictive and compet-
ing ‘prospects’ in an affected person’s future. He says
that when these habit-supporting phenomena interact,
the ultimate effect is to ‘hold addiction in place’.
Ted Fenton & Reinout Wiers [15] applaud Lewis on
the attempt to undo the arguments of the BDMA, and in
particular on his efforts to shine some light on the idea
that addiction is an incurable condition and to reject it.
Yet, like many other contributors they worry about the
severe cases where addiction is very costly. In doing so,
they advocate a ‘gradual model’. On this model some
cases may be regarded as falling within the disease
category, and they take up the question by situating the
classification debate within the free will/autonomy de-
bate. In the most severe cases of addiction agency and
free will are severely threatened, but in other cases they
remain largely intact. The middle range cases combine
elements of loss and preserved agency. Thus we need to
take on board this variety and take seriously the idea that
addiction is on a continuum wherein there are ‘white
swans’ (people whose agency is not at all affected by
their substance use), ‘black swans’ (people who have
barely any agency left due to their addiction), and those
in the middle, or ‘grey geese’. This graded perspective
takes account of the full range of cases: ‘[i] n extreme
cases, with a lot of damage and little or no chance of
recovery, the term brain disease may be in place, such as
in alcohol-dependent patients suffering from KS
[Korsakoff’s Syndrome]. However, in most cases the
term appears to be too extreme, and the more develop-
mental dynamic perspective offered by Lewis and others
may be more accurate.’
Steve Matthews [16] agrees with many aspects of the
account of addiction as habit and learning, but he thinks
a nuanced look at addiction is important. Addiction is an
elastic concept and it is important to avoid generalizing
one’s account of it from some favored range of cases.
Most of those affected are not in the grip of a disorder,
but there are persuasive reasons to think that some
addicted persons are. What are these reasons? Begin-
ning with one of Lewis’s own cases, the case of Johnny
(whose addiction to alcohol was extreme), what we see
is that the process of deep learning has tipped over into a
state of clinically significant impairment and (so) disor-
der. The argument for this begins by framing addictive
processes in terms similar to what goes on in
pathological conditions of dissociation, and then
to compare the losses we see there to those we
see in the extreme cases of addiction. In particular
what we see in these cases is a state of ‘mindless’
consumption where desire is absent from the story
which explains motivated repetition. That being so
we have a case for impairment and disorder if we
think also that such impairment is present in the
comparison case. Does this mean that addiction is
a disorder? Matthews thinks that this question is
wrongly posed, because it does not take account of
the nuanced nature of cases. He thinks the ques-
tion also presupposes that addiction is one thing,
but, like Snoek, he thinks that the process of
addiction contains different phases, and it is only
when the affected person reaches that point where
their choice-making ability is seriously compro-
mised, and external intervention is required to get
well, that addiction deserves to be in the patho-
logical category.
Hanna Pickard [17] agrees with Lewis that it is
wrong to pathologize addictive behavior. Rather than
providing excuses, we should encourage addicted peo-
ple to develop a sense of agency and responsibility.
Once people acknowledge that their use is a choice,
they can change their behavior. Lewis however, rejects
the choice model, out of fear that this theory will lead to
a moralizing attitude towards addiction. But Pickard
argues that we can adopt a choice stance to addiction
while not falling into moralization if we distinguish
responsibility from blame. Pickard is arguably closest
to Lewis on the classification question. She says ‘I agree
with Lewis that addiction is not a disease – at least given
the typical meaning and implications of that concept. I
am also sceptical that, given the state of our current
understanding and evidence, we are justified in
maintaining that the brain changes caused by re-
peated drug use are correctly classified as patho-
logical. And I believe Lewis is correct to
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emphasize the central importance of a sense of
agency, empowerment, and personal growth and
self-understanding, in overcoming addiction.’
Anke Snoek [18] proposes replacing the notion of
addiction as a disease with a notion of a disease-like
stage in addiction. She calls this stage the duress stage in
addiction, in which the addictive behaviour is largely
impervious to the agent’s values and to her available
techniques for self-control. Agents in this stage still have
a choice, but such choices are under duress. Outlining
that this is a stage emphasizes that it is not a chronic
condition, and can be overcome. However, the addicted
agent still needs to develop a wide range of strategies to
regain self-control. Snoek raises a question about the
relation between a certain conceptualization of addiction
and its effect on recovery. Which of the available ac-
counts best bootstraps the agency of the affected person?
Although Lewis and Pickard warn that the disease-
model of addiction risks making people underestimate
their agency, Snoek warns that overestimating people’s
agency bears the risk of them becoming demoralized
when they relapse, with a consequent loss of belief in
self-efficacy. We need a concept of addiction that both
acknowledges people’s sense of agency and the hard-
ships they encounter in controlling their use. She argues
that restoring people’s sense of self-efficacy requires
more than just telling them that they can overcome
addiction because they do not have a disease. They need
to experience success as well in their attempts, and in
order to have success they need to be realistic about the
hardships they will encounter, and have strategies to
overcome the hurdles.
Concluding Remark
Overall, these articles provide a systematic analysis
of the challenges the BDMA faces, the merits and
shortcomings of Lewis’s developmental learning
model, and many fruitful suggestions for a third
wave in how we may conceptualize addiction and
the practices surrounding it. It is clear from these
articles that we are developing increasingly so-
phisticated and nuanced theories about the mech-
anisms that underlie addiction, and as a result
new approaches for cl inical practices and
treatment.
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